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International cooperation on the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions, disarmament, or free 
trade needs to be negotiated. The success of such negotiations depends on how they are 
designed. In the context of international climate change policy, it has been proposed [e.g., 
Weitzman J of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists (2014)] that shifting 
the negotiation focus to a uniform common commitment (such as a uniform minimum carbon 
price) would lead to more ambitious cooperation. Yet, a proof-of-concept for this important 
claim is lacking. Based on game theoretical analyses, we present experimental evidence that 
strongly supports this conjecture. In our study, human subjects negotiate contributions to a public 
good. Subjects differ in their benefits and costs of cooperation. Participation in the negotiations 
and all commitments are voluntary. We consider treatments in which agreements are 
enforceable, and treatments in which they have to be self-enforcing. In both situations, 
negotiating a uniform common commitment is more successful in promoting cooperation than 
negotiating individual commitments (as in the Paris agreement) and complex common 
commitments that tailor the commitment to the specific situation of each party (as attempted with 
the Kyoto protocol). Furthermore, as suggested by our model, a uniform common commitment 
benefits most from being enforced.  
Significance Statement 
Climate change and other threats to modern societies require international cooperation.  Utilizing 
a laboratory experiment and game theoretical analysis, we find that the success of negotiations to 
promote cooperation strongly depends on the kind of commitment negotiated. In the context of 
international climate policy, our findings indicate that individual commitments (as negotiated in 
the Paris Agreement) and complex common commitments (as negotiated in the Kyoto Protocol) 
tend to have only limited success in promoting cooperation. Shifting the negotiation focus to a 
uniform common commitment, such as a minimum carbon price, may potentially foster more 








International cooperation on climate change, free trade, and disarmament requires successful 
negotiations about how much each party contributes to the public good. The success or failure of 
these negotiations depends on how they are designed (1). Particularly, in the context of 
international climate change policy, it has been hypothesized that negotiating a uniform common 
commitment would be more successful in achieving cooperation than negotiating individual or 
complex common commitments (2–5). Yet, a proof-of-concept for this important claim is 
lacking. Using a laboratory experiment with human subjects and a game theoretical analysis, we 
fill the gap – and provide strong support for the conjecture. 
We consider a canonical public good problem. Asymmetry is known to be an essential 
complication to international agreements (6), so – besides a control with fully symmetric parties 
– negotiators in our main laboratory treatment differ in their initial endowment, in how much 
they benefit from the public good and how much of it they want to be provided. Lack of 
enforcement is another fundamental problem that hinders international cooperation (7–9), so we 
look at a situation where parties can write a binding and enforceable contract and at a situation 
where the agreement has to be self-enforcing. Negotiations differ in two dimensions. First, 
parties can negotiate a common goal to be achieved either by individual commitments (each 
party deciding individually how much to contribute) or by a common commitment (all parties 
deciding jointly and unanimously on all contributions). Second, a common commitment may be 
achieved either by a complex assignment (tailoring each individual contribution to its individual 
costs and benefits) or by a uniform rule (disregarding individual differences). In all treatments, 
participation in the negotiation and commitments are voluntary.  
We find that negotiation design is of first order importance. If negotiations are focused on a 
uniform common commitment, contribution levels are about twice as high as compared to 
negotiations focusing on individual or complex common commitments. Negotiating a complex 
common commitment is slightly more successful at the extensive margin by inducing more 
parties to participate, but it is dominated at the intensive margin by the uniform commitment 
because negotiators often fail to coordinate any agreement. Negotiating individual commitments 
is equally successful as a uniform common commitment in getting parties to participate, but 
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again at substantially lower contribution levels. One reason for the superior performance at the 
intensive margin is that negotiating a uniform common commitment turns (reciprocal) 
cooperation into a weakly dominant strategy for all participating parties. The results are robust 
and hold not only in the case where contracts are binding and enforceable (as predicted by 
theory), but even in the case where agreements cannot be enforced but have to be self-
enforceable (in which case standard game theory predicts zero cooperation across all treatments).  
Our study is motivated by, and potentially important for, international negotiations on climate 
change (5). There have been two major approaches to negotiating international climate 
cooperation. In the Kyoto negotiations, the developed countries strived for a complex assignment 
of national emission caps. However, no such assignment (that the negotiating parties could all 
agree upon) has been found. Eventually, each country chose its emission cap individually, which 
then became part of the Kyoto protocol (4, 10). Some countries later withdrew from the Kyoto 
protocol, others did not live up to their promises, and a planned follow-up protocol was never 
ratified.  
In the Paris negotiations, instead of attempting a common commitment, each country pledged 
an individually chosen commitment (“nationally determined contributions”). The Paris 
agreement succeeded in being signed by all countries (although the US decided later to withdraw 
its participation). However, the announced individual commitments fall substantially short of 
achieving the two-degree-goal (11, 12).  
There is a new proposal that negotiations should focus on a common carbon price (2, 3, 13, 
14). Previous authors advocated carbon pricing as an instrument to implement the reduction of 
carbon emissions at low economic cost (15, 16). The new proposal points to a different and 
independent argument: A carbon price provides a simple focal point for a common commitment 
in climate negotiations – one number that applies to all countries in the same way. This 
facilitates agreement (17) and fosters reciprocity (2, 3, 14, 18, 19) which is key to cooperation 
(20–24). Yet, evidence showing that negotiating a uniform carbon price can be more successful 
than negotiating a vector of emissions caps (as in Kyoto) or nationally determined contributions 
(as in Paris) is lacking.  
This paper provides evidence, based on experimental and game theoretical analyses, that a 
uniform common commitment better promotes cooperation than the alternative commitments. 
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The advantage of a laboratory experiment is that it allows to study the negotiation outcomes after 
exogenous changes in the negotiation design, as well as the mechanisms that causally drive 
behavior. While all theory and experiments necessarily abstract from many real-world 
complexities, our study informs the important debate about how to approach climate negotiations 
by providing a “proof of concept”, experimentally and theoretically, that negotiating a uniform 
common commitment may be more successful than previous negotiation designs.  
 
Experiment Design and Related Studies 
The human-subject experiment builds on a linear one-shot public good game with four parties 
who differ in their initial endowments and the costs and benefits of their investments into a 
common project (see the Supplementary Information for details). The experiment is framed 
neutrally. If applied to climate change negotiations the investments can be interpreted as 
emission reductions or carbon prices, but there was no reference to climate change in the 
experiment. In this game, it is a dominant strategy for each party not to invest anything into the 
common project, but all parties are better off if all invest.  
The public good game is preceded by a three-stage negotiation procedure. At the first stage, 
all parties decide simultaneously whether to participate in the negotiation. At the second stage, 
participants make publicly displayed proposals for a potential agreement. Each party can replace 
its current proposal with a new proposal at any time. At the third stage, they can simultaneously 
commit to an agreement.  
After the negotiation, all parties decide simultaneously how much to invest in the public good. 
In the treatments with enforcement parties who committed to an agreement in the negotiation 
phase must match or exceed their commitments, while non-participants and participants who did 
not reach an agreement can choose any investment they like. In the treatments with no 
enforcement all parties are unconstrained in choosing their investment level, no matter whether 
they participated in an agreement.  
We compare three negotiation designs that differ in what is being negotiated. In Individual 
Commitment (IC) each participant proposes how much she is willing to invest. While she may 
also propose how much each other participant should invest, the final, binding proposal is only 
for her own, individual commitment. In Complex Common Commitment (CCC) each participant 
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proposes how much each party should invest. The final proposal specifies the vector of 
investments, one investment for each of the participants. It becomes a binding commitment if 
and only if all participants agree to the same vector, implying that each negotiator has the power 
to veto any given proposal. In Uniform Common Commitment (UCC), each participant proposes 
a uniform minimum investment for all participants. By participating the parties agree that the 
lowest of all proposals (i.e. the least cooperative proposal) becomes binding for all participants. 
No party can be committed to a higher contribution than its own proposal. For more details on 
the experimental procedures see Materials and Methods below.  
Our study is closely related to an important experimental literature on minimum contributions 
in public good games (25), because our uniform commitment treatment imposes a minimum 
contribution level. This literature mostly corroborates our finding that imposing a minimum 
contribution is effective in promoting cooperation, and it does so under various laboratory 
conditions. For instance, it has been shown that a minimum contribution level may promote 
cooperation (i) regardless of whether it is imposed endogenously, exogenously, or by a central 
authority (26, 27), (ii) for a variety of payoff functions including concave ones (28), and (iii) 
under various forms of payoff asymmetries among subjects (29–32). A few studies mention 
potential challenges. For instance, there is evidence that, in specific circumstances, a minimum 
contribution level might crowd out contributions of otherwise cooperative subjects, yet other 
experiments find no or only small crowding out (27, 28, 33). Other studies come to mixed 
conclusions regarding subjects’ willingness to voluntarily participate in coalitions to provide the 
public good (34, 35). Finally, a related theoretical literature studies the effectiveness of 
commitment devices absent strong institutions, such as through the usage of deposits (36). Our 
study contributes to this literature by comparing the effectiveness of uniform common 
commitment negotiations with both individual and complex common commitments negotiations, 
and by studying how these three negotiation designs differ regarding participation decisions and 
enforcement. It is designed to capture some of the key features of the three leading approaches to 
negotiating climate cooperation that have been implemented or proposed.  
 
Game-theoretic Analysis and Predictions 
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A game-theoretic analysis of the treatments with enforcement, assuming that all parties are 
rational and purely self-interested, predicts that the success of climate negotiations depends on 
the negotiation design (for the full analysis see SI Appendix, S3 Theoretical predictions and 
hypotheses)). In IC, because commitments are individual and non-reciprocal, it is a dominant 
strategy for each party to commit to an investment level of zero. In stark contrast, in UCC there 
is a unique Nash equilibrium in weakly dominant strategies that achieves the socially efficient 
outcome if at least three parties participate in the negotiations. This is because the participant 
proposing the lowest uniform commitment determines the outcome. Assuming that enough 
parties participate, if this participant raises her proposed commitment, she raises it for all 
participants, making herself (and everybody else) better off. Thus, each participant is predicted to 
propose the commitment level that she would like to be imposed on all participants.  At the same 
time, high investment proposals are protected against exploitation, because nobody has to invest 
more than any other participant. In this sense, UCC successfully builds reciprocity (“I will if you 
will”) into the negotiation design. 
Finally, in CCC there are multiple equilibria. If at least three parties participate in the 
negotiations, almost any vector of investments is a Nash equilibrium in the negotiation subgame. 
No standard refinement selects one of these equilibria as the most plausible one to be played. 
While there are many equilibria yielding an efficient outcome, none of them gives rise to equal 
payoffs. Without a focal point for an agreement, coordination is difficult (2, 17). Each negotiator 
prefers an agreement in which others are committed to invest more and she herself is committed 
to invest less. Whether parties are able to solve this coordination problem is an empirical 
question that is addressed by our experiments.   
Based on the game-theoretic analysis of the experiment with enforcement we predict IC 
negotiations to be least effective and UCC negotiations to be very effective. The efficiency of the 
CCC negotiations may equal that of IC or UCC or be somewhere in between. At the same time, 
however, more effective negotiation designs tend to give stronger incentives to free-ride by not 
participating in the negotiations in the first place. A party that does not participate in the 
negotiations benefits from the commitment of the negotiators while she is free to choose how 
much to invest herself. This may mitigate the success of effective negotiation design.  
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On the other hand, there is reason to expect that the participation rate will be high in all 
treatments, including UCC. A large body of behavioral and experimental research shows that 
many people are “conditional cooperators”, willing to invest more than predicted by pure self-
interest if others invest as well (37–39). It has been suggested that conditional cooperators are 
also more willing (than predicted by their narrow self-interest) to participate in institutions that 
promote cooperation (35).  
In the treatments with no enforcement parties have to rely on non-binding agreements. Here 
the assumption that all parties are rational and purely self-interested implies that agreements are 
cheap talk and that nobody will invest anything in the common project no matter what the 
negotiation design. However, behavioral economics, economic psychology, and experimental 
evidence suggest that non-binding agreements and promises do affect behavior (40, 41).  
 
Results  
Figure 1 shows the results of the experiment with enforcement and confirms that negotiation 
design strongly affects negotiated outcomes. Cooperation levels, as measured by commitments 
and actual investments (averaged over all subjects), are much higher in UCC compared to IC and 
CCC. The average commitment measured in percent of the socially optimal level is almost twice 
as high in UCC (73%) as in IC (40%) and CCC (33%). All differences are statistically 
significant. The average investment in UCC is even higher, 83% of the social optimum, while the 
investments in IC and CCC reach only 45% and 48%, respectively. This difference is again 
statistically highly significant, while the difference between IC and CCC is not statistically 
significant. See SI Appendix, S3 Additional experimental results and statistical analysis for the 
full statistical analysis. 
9 
 
    
Fig. 1. Enforcement treatments: Cooperation measured by commitments, participation and investments 
across negotiation treatments when contracts are enforced. The bars display the average commitments (left 
diagram) and investments (right diagram) in percent of the socially optimal investment level in the three treatments. 
The averages are calculated with respect to the whole group of subjects, regardless of whether subjects participated 
in the negotiation or not, thus illustrating the groups’ overall cooperation level. The violet diamonds above the bars 
in the left diagram display the participation rates. Error bars represent SE of the mean clustered at the matching 
group level. The results are based on 1,060 observations of commitment, investment and participation decisions of 
212 individuals. Each individual participated in one treatment only and took decisions in five anonymous and 
randomly re-matched groups. 
The game-theoretic analysis assumes that all people are purely self-interested. Therefore, it 
predicts that IC yields zero investments and that investments should never exceed commitments. 
Figure 1 shows, however, that IC is to some extent effective and that in all three treatments some 
subjects invest more than they are committed to do. This is consistent with overwhelming 
evidence that many people (and countries) are not purely self-interested, but are willing to make 
voluntary contributions to the public good (12, 42). However, the data also show that this 
motivation alone falls substantially short of achieving the socially efficient outcome.  
Because UCC is so effective in achieving cooperation of the parties that participate in 
negotiations, it could also be more susceptible to free-riding by non-participants. Yet, the 
participation rate in UCC is with 82% almost as high as in IC (83%). The rate in CCC is with 
88% statistically significantly higher, but the difference is small in absolute terms. Thus, as 







































Fig. 2. Inside negotiations: Commitment, agreement, and coalition size when contracts are enforced. The bars 
show average commitments (in percent of the socially optimal investment level) conditional on participation as a 
function of the coalition size in each treatment. In contrast to Fig. 1 subjects who did not participate in negotiations 
are not included. Error bars represent SE of the mean clustered at the matching group level. The commitment levels 
in UCC are generally much higher than the commitment levels in IC and CCC. The black triangles show the 
distribution of the number of participants in negotiations (“coalition size”). In all treatments, larger coalitions are 
much more frequent than smaller coalitions. The purple diamonds show the frequency of agreements for different 
coalition sizes. Full agreement is built into IC and UCC, while CCC negotiations fail in more than half of all cases. 
This is the main reason for the poor performance of CCC. In those cases where an agreement is reached, 
commitments in CCC reach on average 87% of the efficient level.   
 
Two other factors are decisive for the superior performance of UCC, illustrated by Figure 2. 
The first is the choice of commitment levels by the negotiating parties. The reciprocal nature of 
UCC negotiations creates incentives to choose the socially optimal commitment if the coalition 
size is sufficiently large. Indeed, overall, UCC negotiators commit to an average of 89% of the 
socially optimal investment. If all four parties participate in the negotiations, UCC negotiators 
reach almost full efficiency (96%, see Figure 2). If CCC negotiators come to an agreement, they 
reach a significantly lower level of efficiency (87% on average), but this is still much higher than 
the average commitment for IC negotiators of only 48%. 
The second factor is the likelihood that any given group of negotiators will reach an 
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coordination is difficult. Indeed, on average, only 43% of all CCC negotiations result in a 
common commitment with little variation across coalition sizes (see purple diamonds in Figure 
2). The failure to successfully coordinate in complex negotiations reduces the overall 
commitment level in CCC (averaged across all negotiators) to 37%. On the other hand, there is 
always an agreement in IC and UCC. By definition, the individual commitments in IC do not 
require coordination. UCC negotiations impose the rule that the lowest proposed investment 
level becomes binding for all participants, so an agreement to the lowest common denominator is 
always reached. 3   
We conclude that while (on average) IC fails to promote individual cooperation and CCC fails 
to promote coordination, UCC achieves both, agreement and high investment levels.  
 
Robustness: No Enforcement Treatment and Additional Results 
For international agreements, enforcement is an important challenge. Although some 
enforcement is often possible (e.g., through shaming, the threat of retaliation in repeated 
interaction or just because sticking to one’s previous commitments and promises in negotiations 
is ‘the right thing to do’) (8, 9), it cannot be taken for granted.  Thus, as a robustness check, we 
conducted a stress test of our institutions, where agreements are not binding and can be violated 
at no cost. In the treatments without enforcement investment levels are lower, as expected. But 
surprisingly, our qualitative results are unaffected (see Fig. 3). Parties invested 52% of the 
efficient level in UCC but only 34% in both, IC and CCC. This not only refutes the standard 
game-theoretic prediction of no investments in all three treatments, it also shows that negotiation 
design systematically affects cooperation even when agreements are non-binding, just as in the 
treatments with enforcement. A possible explanation is given by recent results in behavioral 
economics on promises and honesty (40, 41, 43). When people are given an opportunity to 
increase their payoff by breaking a promise, some of them do, but many do not or do not fully 
                                                          
3 Even though participants often failed to reach an agreement in CCC, lack of negotiation time does not seem to 
have been the critical issue. We asked subjects after the experiment whether they felt that more time would have 
been needed. On a scale from 1 (“do not agree at all”) to 7 (“fully agree”), a large majority of 62.5% answered with 
1 or 2 while only 12.5% answered with 6 or 7. Perhaps not surprisingly, the average answer in in IC (2,3) and UCC 
(1,2) was even lower than in CCC (2.72), but not by much.  
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exploit the opportunities for cheating (44). As a result, non-binding agreements do affect 
behavior, but they are not as powerful as enforceable contracts.  
From our treatments with and without enforcement, we conclude that negotiating a uniform 
commitment is much more successful in promoting cooperation than the alternative negotiation 
designs. Even without enforcement a uniform common commitment achieves significantly 
higher average investments than individual commitments and common complex commitments 
with enforcement.  Moreover, UCC benefits most from an enforcement technology: Enforcement 
increases investments by 31 percentage points in UCC, but only by 11 and 14 percentage points 
in IC and CCC, respectively. That is, while enforcement is clearly important, it is not sufficient 
to achieve cooperation. Rather, its effectiveness – in line with our theoretical analysis – depends 
on negotiation design.   
 
     
Fig. 3. No Enforcement treatments: Cooperation measured by non-binding commitments, participation and 
investments across negotiation treatments when there is no enforcement. Fig. 3 corresponds to Fig. 1, but 
without enforcement. The bars display the average non-binding commitments (left diagram) and investments (right 
diagram) in percent of the socially optimal investment level in the three treatments. Because in this treatment 







































respect to the whole group of subjects, regardless of whether subjects participated in the negotiation or not, thus 
illustrating the groups’ overall cooperation level. The violet diamonds above the bars in the left diagram display the 
participation rates. Error bars represent SE of the mean clustered at the matching group level. The results are based 
on 760 observations of commitment, investment and participation decisions of 152 individuals. Each individual 
participated in one treatment only and took decisions in five anonymous and randomly re-matched groups. 
 
Our results and interpretations are also robust to learning and variations in the (as)symmetry 
of parties. In all treatments, subjects interacted anonymously over five rounds. In each round, 
groups were randomly re-matched (stranger treatment). If we look at the behavior over time, we 
find a small negative time trend for investments, very similar in all treatments, of about 2 
percentage points per period. There is no time trend in participation decisions in any of the 
treatments (see SI Appendix, S3 Additional experimental results and statistical analyses).  
In an additional experiment we consider a symmetric public good game (with enforcement) in 
which all four parties have the same payoff function (see supplementary materials for details). 
Without asymmetries, a natural focal point for cooperation is equal and efficient investments, 
which removes the complexity of CCC negotiations and thus mitigates one key difference 
between UCC and CCC. In fact, while the participation rates are somewhat smaller than in the 
baseline, overall investment levels are now very similar in UCC (57 %) and CCC (58%, no 
statistically significant difference), but still significantly smaller in IC (41%). This shows that the 
lack of a focal point in the asymmetric CCC negotiations is the main driver for the superior 
performance of UCC in the baseline experiment (see SI Appendix, S3 Additional experimental 
results and statistical analyses).  
 
Conclusions 
Our study provides causal evidence that a negotiation design that focuses on a uniform common 
commitment can be more successful in achieving cooperation than individual commitments or 
complex common commitments. Negotiating a uniform common commitment is superior in our 
experiments both when agreements are binding and when they are not. Moreover, as predicted by 
theory and confirmed by the experiments, when enforcement is available, it can most effectively 
promote cooperation when negotiators focus on a uniform common commitment.  
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Because our laboratory study controls away potentially confounding factors in the world 
outside the laboratory, we caution that, of course, one cannot conclude from our study that 
switching the negotiation style will automatically lead to more cooperation in the real-world. For 
instance, the number of parties in the negotiation might differently affect the effectiveness of 
each of the negotiation designs, which in turn might affect the number of parties that should be 
invited to the negotiations. We leave such questions to future studies. 
That said, our study complements previous discussions and previous evidence in several, less-
controlled field studies suggesting that reciprocal common commitments may indeed be crucial 
for achieving cooperation (4, 20, 45). It also offers a ‘proof of concept’ for a key negotiation 
design choice when the goal of the negotiation is to promote cooperation. 
The Paris agreement will be reviewed and further developed over the next years. How to 
achieve more ambitious cooperation will be an important concern in this process. Our study 
suggests that parties should consider shifting a focus of the negotiations to a uniform, reciprocal 
target. One natural candidate would be a uniform minimum price for carbon emissions. It is a 
simple and transparent policy instrument that is relatively easy to measure and to compare across 
countries, and that can be flexibly implemented with taxes, markets for emission rights, or hybrid 
policies (24). Because a uniform price minimizes total costs of reducing CO2 emissions, it is also 
a widely accepted goal already, supported by advocates of a carbon tax as well as by promoters 
of cap-and-trade.  
While our experiments exogenously imposed the kind of contract that could be agreed upon, it 
would be interesting to study the choice of agreement that negotiators strive for  (27, 32), and 
how this depends on the problem under consideration. For price agreements, it often seems 
natural to look for a uniform common commitment that applies the same price to all parties, such 
as a uniform minimum price for carbon, a uniform minimum tax on corporate profits or a 
uniform maximum tariff on imports. In other contexts, however, a uniform proportional rule may 
be more appropriate. For instance, countries may wish to contribute to a Green Fund in 
proportion to their GDP or to their cumulative carbon emissions in the past. We must leave such 
questions to future research.   
An important concern is that with 192 countries there will always be some countries that are 
unwilling to support an ambitious climate policy for political or economic reasons. Integrating 
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these parties in an international agreement based on the lowest common denominator, as 
stipulated by the unanimity rule of our UCC design, would impede any cooperation. Thus, as 
forcefully advocated by Nordhaus  (5, 14) it may be preferable to start out negotiating a uniform 
carbon price within a “climate club” of some of the main players (e.g. the US, Europe, China, 
and Japan), and to extend the carbon price to other countries using sticks (e.g. border adjustment 
taxes) and carrots (e.g. support through a Green Fund) at a later stage.   
 
Materials and Methods 
The experiment (including six pilot sessions) was preregistered at AsPredicted.org (see SI 
Appendix, S5 Preregistration). The full study protocol was approved by the Institutional Review 
Board (“Ethics committee” of the Faculty of Economics) at the University of Munich where the 
study was conducted, and it included informed consent by all participants (see SI Appendix, S6 
Ethics approval). It took place at the Munich Experimental Laboratory for Economic and Social 
Sciences (MELESSA) in 2018. There were 23 sessions, each divided into two matching groups, 
and 500 participants in total. Sessions lasted about 90 minutes and yielded average earnings of € 
19.91 (approx. $ 24.00). Table S1 in SI Appendix displays the demographic summary statistics of 
all experimental sessions. 
Subjects interacted anonymously via a computer network. After reading the instructions and 
answering test questions the subjects played the negotiation game five times with random 
rematching within each matching group after each period (“stranger condition”). Then they had 
to complete a short questionnaire. Finally, the computer randomly selected one period for 
payment (see SI Appendix, S7 Instructions, for the full text of the instructions).  
In the experiment with enforcement four parties can write a binding contract on 
“investments” in a public good, called “group project”. If investments 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 ∈ [0, 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚] , 𝑖𝑖 ∈
{𝐴𝐴, … ,𝐷𝐷}, are made, the payoff of party 𝑖𝑖 is given by 



















where 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖 is the initial endowment, 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 < 1 the marginal individual return of the investment, and 
𝑋𝑋�𝑖𝑖 the maximum total investment above which further investments are no longer beneficial for 
party 𝑖𝑖. The values of these parameters are summarized in SI Appendix, Table S2. Total surplus is 
maximized if  ∑ 𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗4𝑗𝑗=1 = 300. The investments can be interpreted as emission reductions or carbon 
prices. However, the experiment is framed neutrally without any reference to climate change.  
Before investment decisions are made, parties can negotiate a binding contract as described 
above. At the negotiation stage all participating parties can make proposals and counterproposals 
for three minutes in real time. If a proposal is made, all parties see the proposal along with the 
payoff consequences implied by the proposal.   
If a contract is agreed upon, each contracting party has to invest at least the amount it committed 
to in the contract. A party that did not participate in the negotiations can choose any investment 
level 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 ∈ [0, 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚]. 
The experiment with no enforcement is identical to the experiment with enforcement with the 
only exception that the “contract” is called an “agreement” and that it is common knowledge that 
this agreement is not enforced. Thus, at the investment stage all parties can choose any investment 
level 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 ∈ [0, 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚].  
Finally, we conducted a control experiment with symmetric parties that has the exact same 
structure as the experiment with enforcement, but here all four parties have the same endowments 
and payoff functions that are the averages of the parameters of the asymmetric treatments (see SI 
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S1. Summary statistics and parameters of the experiment 
 
Table S1 displays the summary statistics on observations and demographics in the different 
treatments. 
                                    






   
Total
      gender age native field of study 





























(enf) 360 72 3 6 57 18 75 7 78 11 18 4 16 10 20 22 
2 
CCC 
(enf) 360 72 3 6 54 19 75 3 81 18 10 4 17 14 25 13 
3 
UCC 
(enf) 340 68 3 6 49 22 68 9 87 12 4 6 16 18 25 19 
4 
IC  
(no enf) 180 36 2 4 58 3 94 3 81 17 17 14 8 22 17 6 
5 
CCC 
(no enf) 220 44 2 4 59 23 75 2 75 16 11 5 11 5 27 25 
6 
UCC 
(no enf) 360 72 3 6 60 11 83 6 93 14 11 6 10 19 19 21 
7 
IC 
(symm) 240 48 2 4 58 8 81 11 77 10 13 10 6 15 31 15 
8 
CCC 
(symm) 220 44 2 4 70 16 80 2 84 7 16 7 16 25 14 16 
9 
UCC 
(symm) 200 44 2 4 70 16 84 0 82 32 16 5 9 7 14 18 
  total 2480 500 22 44 59 16 78 5 82 15 12 6 13 15 22 18 
                  
Table S1. Summary statistics of all experimental sessions. Each session is divided in two 
matching groups. Subjects are randomly rematched after each round within a matching group, 





Table S2 displays the parameters of the asymmetric public good game. 
 
 
i wi ai ximax 𝑋𝑋�𝑖𝑖 
A 200 0.4 100 340 
B 120 0.4 100 340 
C 100 0.8 80 300 
D 80 0.6 80 300 
 




S2. Theoretical predictions and hypotheses 
We analyze the game played in the experiment with enforcement by backward induction. If all 
parties are perfectly rational and only concerned about their own material payoff we get the 
following predictions for the outcome of the negotiation subgame (given the participation 
decisions at stage 1) in the three treatments.   
Proposition 1 [Individual Commitment]: In the IC treatment it is a dominant strategy for 
each party to commit to an investment of 0.  
Proof: At the commitment stage, the marginal return for each party 𝑖𝑖 ∈ {𝐴𝐴, … ,𝐷𝐷} is given by  
𝜕𝜕𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖
𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖
= �−1 + 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 < 𝑋𝑋
�𝑖𝑖
−1 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 ≥ 𝑋𝑋�𝑖𝑖
 
Thus, because 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 < 1 for all 𝑖𝑖 ∈ {𝐴𝐴, … ,𝐷𝐷}, it is a dominant strategy for each player to choose 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 =
0, no matter what had been proposed at the negotiation stage.     
  
Proposition 2 [Complex Common Commitment]: Let 𝑆𝑆 ⊆ {𝐴𝐴,𝐵𝐵,𝐶𝐶,𝐷𝐷} denote the coalition 
of participating parties. If |𝑆𝑆| ≥ 2 and if  𝑆𝑆 ≠ {𝐴𝐴,𝐵𝐵}, then every investment profile 𝑥𝑥 =









is a Nash equilibrium in the commitment subgame. If  𝑆𝑆 = {𝐴𝐴,𝐵𝐵}, the only NE is 𝑥𝑥𝐴𝐴 = 𝑥𝑥𝐵𝐵 = 0. 
Proof: In CCC the negotiation subgame admits multiple equilibria because each party is pivotal 
for the contract to become binding. It is always a Nash equilibrium that parties agree to the null 
contract (i.e., do not agree), but any contract that gives each party at least its outside option utility 
can also be sustained as a NE. In particular, many different efficient investment profiles can be 
sustained giving rise to different payoff distributions.                                                                       □ 
 
Proposition 3 [Uniform Common Commitment]: If |S|=4, there is a unique Nash equilibrium 
in undominated strategies in the commitment subgame with 
𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 = �
85, 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑖𝑖 = {𝐴𝐴,𝐵𝐵}
75, 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑖𝑖 = {𝐶𝐶,𝐷𝐷} 
giving rise to a minimum investment of 75 and the efficient total investment of 300.  
If |𝑆𝑆| = 3 or |𝑆𝑆| = 2 and 𝐴𝐴,𝐵𝐵 ∉ |𝑆𝑆|, then there is a unique Nash equilibrium in undominated 
strategies with 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 = 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚. If |𝑆𝑆| = 2 and 𝐴𝐴 ∈  |𝑆𝑆| or  𝐵𝐵 ∈  |𝑆𝑆| , then all Nash equilibria give rise 
to a minimum investment of 0.  
Proof: In UCC the negotiating parties have strong incentives to raise the proposed minimum 
investment, if enough parties participate in the negotiations. If 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 ≥ min𝑗𝑗≠𝑖𝑖 �𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗�, then 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 does not 
affect the outcome. But if  𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 < min𝑗𝑗≠𝑖𝑖 �𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗�, then party 𝑖𝑖 can raise the investments of all parties by 
raising its proposed 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖. Thus, the marginal return of increasing 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 is |𝑆𝑆| ∙ 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 while the marginal cost 
is 1. Therefore, if |𝑆𝑆| = 4, it is a weakly dominant strategy to raise 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 up to the level that is 
“socially” optimal from the perspective of party 𝑖𝑖. Note that parties A and B benefit from the 
investments up to a total investment of 340, so they would like to raise the minimum investment 
to 85, while C and D do not benefit from investments beyond a total investment of 300, so they 
will propose a minimum of only 75 (which maximizes total surplus). If |𝑆𝑆| = 3, then 3 ⋅ 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 > 1 
and 3 ⋅ 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 <  𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖, so it is a weakly dominant strategy for all participants to choose 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 = 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚. 
The same holds if  |𝑆𝑆| = 2 and the marginal return of each member of the coalition is greater than 
0.5. However, if |𝑆𝑆| = 2 and one member of the coalition has a marginal return smaller than 0.5 
(which is true for types A and B), then these parties choose 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 = 0.                                                    □ 
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These results make clear-cut and opposite predictions for IC and UCC. In CCC almost any 
outcome can be sustained as a Nash equilibrium, so coordination is an issue. Even if all parties 
want to coordinate on an efficient outcome, there are many efficient equilibria with different payoff 
distributions, none of which gives equal payoffs to all parties. This makes coordination difficult. 
 
We now turn to the participation stage. In IC, given the predicted outcome of the negotiation 
game, parties are indifferent whether to participate, because there will be no contract with positive 
investment levels anyway.4 In CCC and UCC, the more a party expects others to invest if it does 
not participate, the stronger is the incentive to free-ride on others’ commitments. If |𝑆𝑆| > 2, then 
in the negotiation subgame of UCC there is a unique Nash equilibrium in undominated strategies 
giving rise to the efficient outcome, while in the negotiation subgame of CCC there are many 
(efficient and inefficient) equilibria and coordination failure is possible. Thus, free-riding is less 
of a problem in CCC than in UCC. Therefore, we expect that parties participate with a higher 
probability in CCC. This is summarized in the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1 [Enforcement Treatments]:  
a) There is more participation in CCC than in UCC; participation in IC is undetermined.   
b) For any given number of participants contracts are more efficient in UCC than in CCC, and 
least efficient in IC.  
In the experiment with no enforcement, the game theoretic analysis is straightforward. 
Regardless of what the parties agreed to at the negotiation stage, at the investment stage parties 
face a standard public good game in which it is a dominant strategy to invest nothing (see 
Proposition 1). However, it is a well-known fact that many people keep their promises. 5 If the 
parties expect that some fraction of the participants will stick to the agreement, they have similar 
incentives at the negotiation stage as in the main treatments.   
 
 
                                                          
4 Because parties are indifferent in equilibrium, even small deviations from selfishness and rationality may serve as 
a tie-breaker. If, for instance, parties believe that non-participation makes them look uncooperative, might lower 
others’ willingness to cooperate or is more boring than participation, those parties would participate. 
5 Abeler, Noszenzo and Collin (2019), Vanberg (2008) 
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Hypothesis 2 [No Enforcement Treatments]:   
a) If all parties are only interested in their own material payoff, each party chooses an 
investment of zero in all treatments independent of what happened at the negotiation stage. 
b) If some parties experience a disutility from promise breaking, then these parties stick to the 
agreement made at the renegotiation stage while others cheat, so that, overall, (non-binding) 
commitments are positively correlated with investments. As a result, the outcome is 
qualitatively similar to the outcome with enforcement (see Hypothesis 1), yet investment 
levels are lower. 
Finally, consider the Symmetry treatments. Here, all parties have the same payoff functions 
with the average parameters of the asymmetric experiments, i.e., 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖 = 125, 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 = 0.55, 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 =
90 and 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 = 320. The game theoretic analysis is a straightforward adaptation of the analysis of 
the main experiment with very similar results. However, symmetry offers a natural (symmetric) 
focal point in the CCC treatment. Thus, we hypothesize that in CCC parties will agree to a common 
commitment more often. Therefore, we expect the difference between UCC and CCC to be 
smaller. However, because a common commitment in CCC is more likely, parties have a stronger 
incentive to free-ride by not participating in the negotiations.  
Hypothesis 3 [Symmetry Treatments]:   
a) The symmetric, efficient outcome with 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 = 75 for all 𝑖𝑖 ∈ {𝐴𝐴,𝐵𝐵,𝐶𝐶,𝐷𝐷}  is a natural focal point 
for agreement in CCC. Because no such focal point exists in the Main treatments, it is more 
likely that the negotiating parties will come to an efficient agreement in Symmetry. This 
reduces the difference between CCC and UCC compared to the Main treatments. 
b) More efficient negotiations reduce the incentive to participate. Thus, the participation rate 




S3. Additional experimental results and statistical analyses 
Enforcement treatments, non-parametric tests: We first compare the participation, 
commitment and investment decisions in the main treatments with enforcement. Fisher’s exact test 
does not reject the hypothesis that the participation decisions in IC and UCC are drawn from the 
same distribution (p=0.365), but it does reject this hypothesis comparing IC and CCC (p=0.044) 
and UCC and CCC (p=0.017). A pairwise comparison of the commitments between the three 
treatments using the Wilcoxon signed rank test rejects the hypothesis that they are drawn from the 
same distribution (p<0.001). Similarly, comparing investments in UCC to those in IC and CCC 
rejects the hypothesis that they are drawn from the same distribution (p<0.001), while the 
hypothesis that investment decisions in IC and CCC are drawn from the same distribution cannot 
be rejected (p=0.4026).  
 
Regression analysis: Table S3 shows an OLS regression analysis of participation, commitments, 
investments and payoffs in the main treatments with enforcement. In comparison to the IC 
treatment, there are no significant differences in CCC, but highly significant and substantial 
differences in UCC. Commitments and investments are 25 (and 28, respectively) percentage points 
higher in UCC, and subjects earn 33 points more on average. However, there is no significant 
difference in the participation decision. Subjects played the experiment five times in a stranger 
matching condition. There is a statistically significant decline of the participation rate of about 2 
percentage points per round and a corresponding small reduction of commitments, investments 





  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Participate Commit Invest Payoff 
          
CCC 0.0472 -5.222 2.508 3.011 
 (0.0441) (4.325) (4.160) (4.968) 
UCC -0.0127 25.03*** 28.69*** 33.09*** 
 (0.0565) (4.362) (4.022) (4.558) 
Round -0.0231*** -3.000** -3.825*** -4.508*** 
 (0.00618) (1.182) (0.846) (1.005) 
Type B -0.0830 -14.87*** -16.40*** -63.60*** 
 (0.0619) (3.779) (3.492) (3.492) 
Type C 0.0264 -2.336 -0.321 -31.18*** 
 (0.0548) (2.662) (3.519) (5.397) 
Type D -0.0491 -13.35*** -14.71*** -71.31*** 
 (0.0524) (3.920) (3.993) (4.090) 
Constant 0.929*** 46.60*** 52.75*** 220.1*** 
 (0.0517) (5.026) (4.628) (4.392) 
     
Observations 1,060 1,060 1,060 1,060 
R-squared 0.027 0.192 0.235 0.456 
Sample IC; CCC; UCC IC; CCC; UCC IC; CCC; UCC IC; CCC; UCC 
 
Table S3. OLS regression analysis of the participation, commitment and investment decisions and 
of the payoffs in the main treatments (asymmetric with enforcement). Robust standard errors in 
parentheses, clustered at matching group level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
 
We also include the types of the players in the regression. Types have no significant effect on 
the participation decision. Type C has only half the initial endowment of type A, but he benefits 
twice as much from contributions to the public good. These two effects cancel each other out, so 
there is no significant difference in the behavior of types A and C. Type B is poorer than A, but 
enjoys the same marginal benefit from contributions to the public good. This type commits and 
invests significantly less than A. The same holds for type D, who has a slightly higher marginal 
benefit, but who is much poorer than A. The different wealth and behavior of the different types 
is also reflected in their payoffs.  Adding demographic controls (gender, age, field of study, 
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political and religious orientation) does not affect significance levels and has little impact on the 
regression coefficients. 
Overall, our laboratory data strongly confirm Hypothesis 1. Moreover, the data show that, 
because more efficient negotiations only marginally hamper participation (if at all), the overall 
cooperation level in UCC is much higher than in CCC and IC.   
 
No Enforcement treatments, non-parametric tests: Fisher’s exact test does not reject the 
hypothesis that the participation decisions in the three treatments are drawn from the same 
distribution (p=0.249). However, a pairwise comparison of the (non-binding) commitments 
between the three treatments using the Wilcoxon signed rank test rejects the hypothesis that they 
are drawn from the same distribution (p<0.001). Similarly, comparing investments in UCC to those 
in IC and CCC rejects the hypothesis that they are drawn from the same distribution (p<0.001), 
while the hypothesis that investment decisions in IC and CCC are drawn from the same distribution 
cannot be rejected (p=0.86). 
Comparing the investment decisions in the UCC treatment of the No Enforcement experiment 
to the investment decisions in the IC and CCC treatments of the Enforcement experiment by using 
a Wilcoxon ranksum test rejects the hypothesis that they are drawn from the same distribution 
(p<0.001). 
Symmetry Treatments, non-parametric tests: Fisher’s exact test rejects the hypothesis that the 
participation decisions in the three treatments are drawn from the same distribution (p <0.001). A 
pairwise comparison of commitment decisions using the Wilcoxon signed rank test rejects the 
hypothesis they are drawn from the same distribution in UCC and IC (p=0.0039) and in UCC and 
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CCC (p=0.0086), while this hypothesis cannot be rejected comparing IC and CCC (p=0.7073). A 
pairwise comparison of investment decisions rejects the hypothesis that they are drawn from the 
same distribution in IC and CCC (p<0.001) and IC and UCC (p<0.001), but this hypothesis cannot 
be rejected comparing CCC and UCC (p=0.7374).  
  
Regression analysis (all treatments): Table S4 shows OLS regressions of participation, 
commitment and investment decisions and of payoffs for all treatments. In the No Enforcement 
treatments, commitments are significantly higher, but investments and payoffs are lower than in 
the main treatments. Commitments, investments and payoffs are also somewhat lower in the 
Symmetry treatment. When we look at the interaction of CCC (UCC) and No Enforcement, the 
coefficients of CCC*NE (UCC*NE) show that the positive effect of No Enforcement on 
commitments is restricted to the IC treatment. Furthermore, the negative effect on investments is 
particularly strong in CCC. The interaction of Symmetry and UCC shows that the participation 
rate is significantly lower with symmetry which results in lower commitments, investments and 
payoffs. There is the same negative time trend as in the main treatments. Types differ only in the 
asymmetric treatments (main and No Enforcement). This is why types are interacted with 
“asymmetric”. The pattern is very similar to what we have seen in the main treatments. Adding 
demographic controls (gender, age, field of study, political and religious orientation) does not 




  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Participate Commit Invest Payoff 
          
CCC 0.0472 -5.222 2.508 3.011 
 (0.0433) (4.250) (4.087) (4.882) 
UCC -0.0127 25.03*** 28.69*** 33.09*** 
 (0.0556) (4.287) (3.952) (4.479) 
No Enforcement  -0 18.92*** -7.658* -9.097* 
 (0.0606) (3.473) (3.854) (4.623) 
Symmetry -0.0133 -7.685 -5.557 -49.27*** 
 (0.0543) (4.889) (6.103) (6.999) 
CCC*NE 0.0104 -25.13*** -2.438 -2.982 
 (0.0689) (7.258) (5.439) (6.519) 
CCC*S -0.131* 8.900 9.900 11.20 
 (0.0656) (7.348) (8.330) (9.721) 
UCC*NE 0.0489 -15.26** -15.66*** -17.64*** 
 (0.0763) (5.893) (5.214) (6.058) 
UCC*S -0.180** -15.49** -16.68** -18.98** 
 (0.0689) (6.502) (6.985) (8.305) 
round -0.0270*** -2.617*** -4.656*** -5.571*** 
 (0.00425) (0.729) (0.555) (0.663) 
B*Asym -0.0440 -10.38*** -8.209** -68.27*** 
 (0.0429) (2.961) (3.423) (3.971) 
C*Asym 0.0615 0.0242 4.429 -40.89*** 
 (0.0388) (2.374) (3.193) (5.011) 
D*Asym -0.0374 -10.57*** -8.536** -76.78*** 
 (0.0381) (3.015) (3.371) (4.925) 
Constant 0.919*** 43.04*** 50.47*** 228.3*** 
 (0.0425) (3.784) (3.824) (4.340) 
     
Observations 2,480 2,480 2,480 2,480 
R-squared 0.052 0.179 0.158 0.392 
Sample all all all all 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at matching group level. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1    
 
Table S4. OLS regression analysis of the participation, commitment and investment decisions and 
of the payoffs in all experiment. The interaction terms are constructed as follows: CCC*NE is a 
dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if we have a treatment with CCC and no enforcement. 
The variable B*Asym is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if a subject is of type B and 
if one of the asymmetric experiments is considered. Robust standard errors in parentheses, 





S.4 Supplementary Figures 
 
 
Fig. S1. No Enforcement treatments, inside negotiations: Commitment, agreement, and coalition size when 
contracts are not enforced. The bars show average (non-binding) commitments conditional on participation (in 
percent of the socially optimal investment level) as a function of coalition size in each treatment. Error bars 
represent SE of the mean clustered at the matching group level. The commitment levels in UCC are significantly 
larger than the individual commitment levels in IC and CCC for coalition sizes of 3 and 4. There are very few 
observations for a coalition size of 2. The black triangles show the distribution of the number of participants in 
negotiations (“coalition size”). In all treatments, larger coalitions are much more frequent than smaller coalitions. 
The purple diamonds show the frequency of agreements as a function of coalition size.  CCC negotiations fail in 
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Fig. S2, Symmetry treatments: Cooperation measured by participation, commitment, and investment 
decision across negotiation treatments when parties are symmetric.  The bars display the average commitments 
(left diagram) and investments (right diagram) in percent of the socially optimal investment level in the three 
treatments. The averages are calculated with respect to the whole group of subjects, regardless of whether subjects 
participated in the negotiation or not, thus illustrating the groups’ overall cooperation level. The violet diamonds 
above the bars in the left diagram display the participation rates. Error bars represent SE of the mean clustered at the 
matching group level. The results are based on 660 observations of commitment, investment and participation 
decisions of 136 individuals. Each individual participated in one treatment only and took decisions in five 













































Fig. S3, Symmetry treatments, inside negotiations: Commitment, agreement, and coalition size when parties 
are symmetric. The bars show average commitments conditional on participation (in percent of the socially optimal 
investment level) as a function of the coalition size in each treatment. Error bars represent SE of the mean clustered 
at the matching group level. The commitment levels in UCC are much higher than the commitment levels in IC and 
CCC if there are three or four participants. The black triangles show the distribution of the number of participants in 
negotiations (“coalition size”). Because the participation rate is lower in the symmetry treatments than in the main 
treatments, the coalition sizes tend to be smaller as well. The purple diamonds show the frequency of agreements for 
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In the following, we provide instructions for the UCC treatment (with enforcement), translated 
from the original German instructions. The instructions of the IC and CCC treatments and of the 
No Enforcement and Symmetry treatments are adapted from the UCC treatment (with 
enforcement) only to reflect the change in rules, but are otherwise identical.  
The instructions are followed by an English translation of the information sheet, which summarizes 
all parameters for the asymmetric treatments and which was provided to participants on a separate 
handout. The information sheet for the subjects in the symmetric treatments is constructed 
analogously.  
We then present translations of the screenshots of the exercises that subjects in the UCC treatment 
(with enforcement) had to answer before the experiment started in order to become familiar with 
the rules of the game. Subjects in other treatments answered analogous questions, adapted to the 
rules in the respective treatment. 
Finally, we present the Questionnaire that all subjects had to answer after the experiment 
(translation from German).  The Questionnaire was the same for all subjects in all treatments.  
The instructions, information sheets, and exercises of all other treatments in the original German 








[Instructions for UCC treatment (with enforcement)] 
Welcome to our experiment! 
Please read these instructions carefully. If you have a question, please raise your hand or press the 
red button on your computer. We will then come to you and answer your question. Private 
communication between participants is not allowed during the experiment. You are also not 
allowed to use your mobile phone during the experiment. Please keep it in your bag. 
For showing up to the experiment, you will receive 6 Euro. In addition, you can earn additional 
payments depending on your decisions and the decisions of other participants. The currency in this 
experiment is called ECU ("Experiment Currency Unit"). At the end of the experiment, all ECUs 
will be converted into Euro and paid out to you in cash. The exchange rate is: 12 ECU = 1 Euro. 
All decisions and payments in this experiment will be treated confidentially and evaluated 
anonymously. All participants in this experiment received the same instructions.  
Procedure of the experiment 
The experiment consists of 5 identical rounds. In each round, you will be assigned to a group of 4 
participants. The group will be randomly reassembled in each round. Each group consists of a 
participant of type A, B, C and D. Which type you are (A, B, C or D) will be displayed on your 
computer screen at the beginning of the experiment. Your type remains the same for all 5 rounds. 
At the beginning of each round, you will receive an endowment (in ECU) depending on your type. 
The richest type A gets 200 ECU in each round, the poorest type D only 80 ECU. You can invest 
any amount of your endowment (up to a maximum amount depending on your type) into a group 
project. The rest of your endowment that you do not invest is yours. It will be paid out to you at 
the end of the experiment.  
Every ECU you invest in the group project is lost to you but will generate additional payments for 
all four group members. The amount of the additional payment for each ECU invested in the group 
project (the rate of return) depends on the type of the group member. If an additional ECU is 
invested in the group project by any participant, then participant A receives an additional payment 
of 0.4, participant B also of 0.4, participant C of 0.8 and participant D of 0.6. Thus, for the group, 
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a total of 2.2 ECU (= 0.4 ECU + 0.4 ECU + 0.8 ECU + 0.6 ECU) is generated by the investment 
of one ECU (see information sheet).  
 
 
Please note that you will only receive payments from the group project as long as the sum of the 
investments of all four group members does not exceed a maximum investment amount. For each 
ECU invested beyond the maximum investment amount, there will be no return from the group 







The enclosed information sheet summarizes this information and all numerical values in a table. 
Please place the information sheet on your desk in such a way that you can always look at this 
information. 
Example 1: You are a type D participant. If you invest 10 ECU in the group project, you 
lose these 10 ECU, but you get 0.6 x 10 ECU = 6 ECU back from the group project. In total 
you have lost only 4 ECU. Participant A wins 4 ECU because of your investment, 
Participant B also wins 4 ECU and Participant C wins 8 ECU. 
Example 2: You are a type D participant again. Now not only you, but each participant 
invests 10 ECU in the group project. You lose 10 ECU again, but now you get 0.6 x 40 = 24 
ECU back from the group project, because all four participants have invested 10 ECU. In 
total you have won 14 ECU (0,6 x 40 – 10 = 14). Participant A wins a total of 6 ECU (0.4 x 
40 - 10 = 6), participant B also wins 6 ECU (0.4 x 40 – 10 = 6) and participant C wins 22 
ECU (0.8 x 40 – 10 = 22). 
Example 3: For Type C, there is a return from the group project only up to a maximum 
investment amount of 300 ECU. Assume that each participant invests 75 so that the 
investment amount is exactly 300 (= 4 x 75). If all four participants would then invest an 
additional ECU in the group project, C would not draw any additional profit from it. He or 
she would only lose the ECU that he or she invested additionally. 
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The task of the group members is to decide in each round how much they want to invest in the 
group project. The investments can be negotiated. 
 
Negotiation 
During the negotiation, the group members can agree on a common commitment that determines 
the investment of each of the four group members. The negotiation process consists of three stages: 
Participation, negotiation and commitment.  
Participation. In the first stage, the group members decide independently whether they wish to 
participate in the negotiation. Members who do not wish to participate do not participate in further 
stages of negotiations and wait until the negotiation process is completed. Their investments are 
not subject to negotiation. After the participation decision, all members are informed about who is 
taking part in the negotiation.  
Negotiation. At the beginning of the negotiation process, each participant specifies a negotiation 
goal that he or she would like to achieve. This negotiation goal is not communicated to the other 
negotiation participants and has no influence on the actual negotiation or the payoffs of the 
participants. The negotiators then have three minutes to exchange proposals for a joint 
commitment. Note: A proposal must specify a minimum investment which is the same for all 
negotiators and cannot exceed the lowest maximum of ECU 80.  Proposals are immediately visible 
to all negotiators and can be changed at any time within the negotiation period of three minutes.  
Commitment. After the three minutes have elapsed, negotiators will be invited to make a final 
proposal independently of each other. The proposal with the lowest minimum investment becomes 
binding for all negotiating members, i.e. all members must invest at least as much as the lowest 
minimum investment.  
Note: The higher the mandatory minimum investment, the more all negotiators have to invest, 
which benefits all negotiators (including yourself). If you have proposed the lowest minimum 
investment, your proposal will result in a low investment commitment for all negotiators, which 
will harm all negotiators (including yourself). A higher proposal increases the commitment of all 
participants, which benefits all participants (including yourself). You also never have to worry 
41 
 
about having to invest more than the other negotiators in a high proposal: You will never be obliged 
to invest more than the negotiator with the lowest proposal in that negotiation.  
 
Investment decision  
The result of the negotiations, i.e. the lowest minimum investment that has become binding, is 
communicated to all four group members. The negotiators must honor their commitment and 
choose an investment that is at least as large as the agreed minimum investment. The group 
Example 4: All four participants participate in the negotiation and have proposed the 
following minimum investments: 100 (A), 60 (B), 80 (C) and 40 (D). The proposal of 
participant D is the lowest and is therefore binding for all participants. So each 
participant only has to invest 40 - even the participants who have proposed a higher 
minimum investment.  
Note: If participant D increases his proposal from 40 to 50, all negotiators will have to 
invest 10 more. This increases the payment to D by 14 ECU. The payments to all other 
participants also increase. If D, on the other hand, reduces the lowest minimum 
investment to 30, then all participants only have to invest 30. But if all participants invest 
only 30 instead of 40, the payment to D is reduced by 14 ECU. The payments to all other 
participants also decrease.  
The payments to participants A and B are highest when the minimum investment of 80 
becomes binding. The payments to participants C and D are highest when a minimum 
investment of 75 becomes mandatory. The reason for this difference is the different 
maximum investment amount from which investments no longer pay off. If all four 
participants invest 75, a total investment of 4 x 75 = 300 is achieved.  Investments 
exceeding the maximum investment of 300 will not pay off for C and D (see information 
sheet).  
Note: Participants A and B can increase their payment without risk by increasing their 
proposed minimum investment to 80. Participants C and D can increase their payment 
without risk by increasing their proposed minimum investment to 75.   
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members who have not negotiated decide freely on their respective investments in the group 
project. 
 
Result of this round 
Now the payments for this round can be calculated. Your payment consists of your endowment 
minus your investment in the group project plus your profit from the group project (i.e. the sum 
of all investments up to your maximum investment sum multiplied by your rate of return per 
ECU from the group project).  
After each round, all participants are informed about the investments and payments of all group 
members. Then the next round begins, in which you are matched with three new, randomly 
selected, other participants. At the end of the experiment, one of the five rounds will be 
randomly selected. The result of this round is paid out to the participants, the other four rounds 
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1. Exercises – UCC (with enforcement) 
 
In the following we replicate the screens that the subjects had to go through when when 
they solved the exercises. The numbers that the subjects had to enter are indicated in red. 
Black numbers are provided by the computer. 
 
Exercises 
In the following exercises, you can try out different scenarios to become more familiar with 
the decision situation. The scenarios should not be seen as suggestions. They have been 
selected by us to cover as wide a range of possible situations as possible. Below you will 
find an input mask in which you can enter how much each of the four participants invests 
in the group project.  
You can use the tab key to conveniently jump back and forth between the input fields.  
Once all the investments have been entered, the bottom line will show the payments that 
would result from these investments to the four participants. Please try it out. 
When you are done, press “Next”. 







  Investment of   




    
  
210 
Payment  230 150 180 160  740 
Next 









Participants A, B and D invest 20, 80 and 30, respectively, into the group project. Enter 
these investments in the input mask. 




















    
  
210 
Payment  264 124 188 176  752 
  
What is your payoff, …  
 
… if you invest 0?                                                       
 
… if you invest 40? 
 






















  Investment of    




    
  
115 
Payment  216 146 152 124  638 
  
What is your payoff …  
 
• if A invests 30, B 20, C 40, and D 25?            
 
• if everybody invests twice as much? 
 




















This screen shows you how the negotiation works when all four participants participate in 
the negotiation. You are participant B. In the upper table you can see the suggestions that 
participants A, C and D have already made. You can enter your own proposal in the input 
mask below. If you enter a minimum investment for a negotiation participant, it will be 
adopted for all participants. As soon as you have made a proposal for a common minimum 
investment, you will see the resulting payments to the participants in the bottom row, if all 
negotiation participants make this minimum investment. 
 




 A B C D  Sum 
A  80  320 
B     
C  65  260 
D  15  60 
 
  Your proposal for the minimum investment of all 
participants 
  





    
320 
Payment  248 168 260 180  856 
 
Participant A has proposed a common minimum investment of 80. Please, type this 
proposal into the input mask. If all participants make this minimum investment, what is 
the payment received 
 
o by you (participant B)?   
 
o by participant D?          
 Next 











Now enter the following proposal into the input mask: 40.  
 
 




 A B C D  Sum 
A  80  320 
B     
C  65  260 
D  15  60 
 
  Your proposal for the minimum investment of all 
participants 
  





    
160 
Payment  224 144 188 136  788 
 
If all participants make the minimum investment of 40, what is the payment received … 
 
 
o by you (participant B)   
 
























 A B C D  Sum 
A  80  320 
B     
C  65  260 
D  15  60 
 
  Your proposal for the minimum investment for all 
participants 
  





    
240 




Enter the following proposal into the input mask: 60 
 
Then click on "Make a proposal". Your proposal will now appear as a proposal from 
participant B in the table above. You can replace your proposal with a new one at any time 
within the negotiation time of 3 minutes. Please replace your proposal with any other 




  Next 
Make a proposal 
60 










Here you can see the screen for your final proposal. In the table above you can see the last 
suggestions made by the four participants during the negotiation phase. You (and the other 
participants) now have the possibility to confirm your proposal or change it one last time. 
   




 A B C D  Sum 
A  30  120 
B  80  320 
C  80  320 
D  60  240 
 
  Your proposal for the minimum investment for all 
participants 
  





    





Suppose that all participants made the following final proposals: 30 (A), 80 (B), 80 (C), 60 
(D). Which minimum investment is now binding for all participants?   
 
You are participant A. In the table you are marked in blue. 








• Binding minimum investment:              
 
 
Please enter the binding minimum investment as your proposal into the input mask. 
If all participants make this minimum investment, what is the payment received … 
 
• by you (participant A)?  
 
• participant D? 
 
Suppose you (participant A) raise your proposal to 70, while all other proposals 
remain the same. What minimum investment is now binding for all negotiators?    
 
• Binding minimum investment:              
 
If all participants make this minimum investment, what is the payment received … 
 
• by you (participant A)?  
 



















Here you can see how the negotiation works when only two participants participate in the 
negotiation. Participants B and C did not participate in the negotiation. You are participant 
D. In the table you can see the proposal that participant A has already made. You can enter 
your own proposal in the input mask below. In addition, you can enter what you expect 
participants B and C to invest. Once you have specified all the investments, you will see 
the payoffs for the participants in the bottom row.   
 
  Minimum investment    
Participant  A D  Sum 
A  80      160 
D     
 
  Your proposal for the 
minimum investment for 
all negotiators 
 Expected investment of   
Participant  A D  B C  Sum 
 
Investment 




Payment  192 108  172 244  716 
 
Participant A proposed 80 as the common minimum investment. Type this proposal into 
the input mask. You expect that participant B will invest 20 and participant C 0. What is 
the payment received 
 
• by you (participant D)?            
 
• by participant A? 
You are participant D. In the table you are marked in blue. 
The following participants decided not to participate in the negotiation: B, C 
108 
192 















Here you can see the screen for the final proposals. In the upper table you see last proposals 
made in the negotiation phase by participant A and by yourself. You (and participant A) 




  Minimum investment   
Proposal of  A D  Sum 
A  80  160 
D     
 
  Your proposal for the 
minimum investment for 
all participants 
 Expected investment of   




   
  
  
Payment         
 
Suppose  the two negotiating parties have entered the final proposals 80 (A) and 40 (D).  
Then a minimum investment of 40 is binding for the negotiating parties. How much has to 
be invested … 
 
Next 
   
The following participants decided not to participate in the negotiation: B, C 








• by you (participant D)? 
 
• by participant A? 
 
• by participant C? 
 
Suppose you (participant D) have increased your final proposal to 60, while A's 
proposal remains unchanged. Then the minimum investment is 60 for the 
negotiating parties. How much has to be invested… 
 
• by you (participant D)? 
 
• by participant A? 
 








End of Exercises 
 
You have now completed the exercises. The experiment starts shortly. Please think for a 
second about what negotiation result you would like to achieve, if you would participate 





















•  male 
•  female 
 
Your subject of study? 
•  Economics 
•  Business Administration 
•  Other Social Sciences 
•  Psychology 
•  Humanities 
•  Law 
•  Natural Science/Technology 
•  Other 
 
Your nationality? 
•  Germany 
•  EU without Germany 








How is your mood today in general? 
•  Very good 
•  Good 
•  Neutral 
•  Bad 
•  Very bad 
 
How was your mood during the experiment? 
•  Very good 
•  Good 
•  Neutral 
•  Bad 
•  Very bad 
 
How often did you participate in experiments? 
•  Never 
•  Once or twice 
•  Three to five times 
•  More than five times 
 
Your mother tongue? 
•  German 








How many participants in the experiment are personally known to you? 
 
Did you ever attend a lecture on „Game Theory“? 
•  Yes 
•  No 
•  Not sure 
On a scale from 1 ("do not agree at all") to 7 ("fully agree"): If the negotiation led to no or only 
small investment commitments, it was because of... 
 
...a lack of time for the negotiation. 
1  7 
...some negotiators not understanding the decision situation enough. 
1  7 
...unfair payments resulting from the negotiations. 
1  7 
...unfair investment commitments resulting from the negotiation. 
1  7 
 
...the following participant not being willing to compromise enough: 
•  A 
•  B 
•  C 
•  D 
•  No type stood out particularly 
 
Which party would you vote for if there was a Bundestag election next Sunday? 
•  CDU/CSU 







•  FDP 
•  Grüne 
•  Die Linke 
•  AfD 
•  Other 
 
How serious do you estimate the dangers of climate change are? 
•  Very serious 
•  Rather serious 
•  Rather insincere 
•  Very insincere 
•  Not sure 
 
Which religious community do you belong to? 
•  Roman-catholic  
•  Protestant  
•  Other Christian religious community 
•  Non-Christian religious community 
•  None 
 
Our everyday actions are influenced by basic principles we belief in. Little is known about 
this in science. Here are different characteristics a person can be described with. Probably, 
some characteristics personally apply to you fully and others do not at all. 
On a scale from 1 ("Not applicable at all") to 7 ("Fully applicable"): I am someone who... 
 
...works carefully. 
1  7 
...is communicative, talkative. 







...is sometimes a bit coarse/rough. 
1  7 
...is inventive and comes up with own ideas. 
1  7 
...worries a lot. 
1  7 
...is able to forgive. 
1  7 
...is rather lazy. 
1  7 
...opens up, is sociable. 
1  7 
...appreciates artistic experiences. 
1  7 
...becomes nervous easily. 
1  7 
...processes tasks efficiently. 
1  7 
...is reserved. 
1  7 
...is considerate and kind towards others. 
1  7 
...has a vivid imagination. 
1  7 
...is relaxed and knows how to cope well with pressure. 
1  7 
 
On a scale from 1 ("Very bad") to 7 ("Very good"): How do you rate the graphical 
implementation of the experiment? 
1  7 
 
On a scale from 1 ("Very difficult") to 7 ("Very simple"): How easy to handle did you find the 
experiment? 
1  7 
 









On a scale from 1 ("very unlikely") to 7 ("very likely"): Would you advise a friend to participate 
in another experiment? 
1  7 
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